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Abstract 
This paper empirically evaluates determinants of depositors’ behaviour in Azerbaijan. The 
response of depositors to macroeconomic, alternative investment and bank specific shocks is 
analyzed by implementing recently developed panel time series methods that are robust to 
regional heterogeneity and inter-dependencies. We consider that macroeconomic and alternative 
investment factors are initially exogenous to the banking system and hit all banks 
simultaneously. Using a monthly panel dataset of Azerbaijan from January 2009 to June 2015, 
the paper provides new evidence regarding the importance of relationship between deposits and 
macroeconomic factors, specifically currency risk. The paper highlights the role of currency risk 
as a determinant of depositors’ behaviour and concludes that its role overshadow the importance 
of alternative investment and bank specific factors in Azerbaijan. Despite of wide variation in 
response of depositors to macroeconomic, alternative investment and bank specific shocks, 
overall, depositors seem more responsive to risks than previous literature have recognized.  
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Introduction 
Recent decline in oil prices are destabilizing economies and financial markets worldwide. Oil 
sector has significant contribution to GDP of Azerbaijan, although authorities’ has recently 
made an effort to reduce country’s dependence on hydrocarbons and diversifying the economy. 
Therefore, recent economic challenges like declining oil price, strengthening dollar due to Fed’s 
tightening monetary policy impact the economy of Azerbaijan as well. Increasing pressure on 
local currency (manat) resulted in currency devaluation in February 2015 which in its turn 
affected banks’ asset quality. Generally, recent episode of economic challenges and currency 
devaluation affects the banking sector via several channels, one of which is the outflow of 
deposits in national currency.  In order to understand the depositors’ reaction to latest economic 
news, our study aims to find answers to the following questions: 1) What factors determine 
depositors’ behaviour in Azerbaijan? 2) Does macroeconomic environment overshadow 
importance of market discipline and alternative investment opportunities?. 
In current literature, the depositors’ behaviour is primarily identified by their response to bank 
specific characteristics and this kind of response ensures market discipline 5 . However, 
introduction of deposit insurance scheme undermines of market discipline, as existence of a 
credible deposit insurance system reduces the incentives of depositors to monitor banks.  In 
countries where deposit insurance funds exist, researchers rely both on bank specific 
characteristics and macroeconomic factors to understand depositors’ decisions. They show that, 
destabilized economy and weakened financial sector damage the credibility of deposit insurance 
and as a result can also affect the depositor’s behaviour. 
For instance, Levy Yeyati et al. (2010) conclude that bank specific characteristics are not the 
only factors affecting depositors’ behaviour. Their paper shows that macroeconomic factors are 
significant drivers of depositor behaviour in crisis periods, at times overshadowing the role of 
bank specific characteristics. Moreover, Martinez Peria and Schmukler (2001), Arena (2003) 
and Dela Torre et al. (2003) argue that during crisis episodes traditional indicators of bank 
fundamentals tend to become less significant and explain a smaller part of changes of deposit 
portfolio and interest rates compared to tranquil times. Motivated from their research question, 
our paper also considers the effect of macroeconomic risk to banking system of Azerbaijan by 
                                                          
5 Market discipline in banking is often described as a situation where depositors face costs that are positively related 
to bank risk and react on the basis of these costs (Berger 1991). In the case of market discipline customers may 
decide to punish banks because of higher risk taking and tend to either withdraw their deposit or demand higher 
interest rates. As customers decide to withdraw their deposits from a risky bank, deposit run problem arises which 
will lead to failure of banking sector as a whole mostly because of liquidity problem.  
 
applying a new methodology of heterogeneous structural panel VAR estimation. In addition, this 
paper includes not only bank specific and macroeconomic variables, but also alternative 
investment factor in Azerbaijan. We introduce a new variable of alternative investment factor - 
house price, as a possible driver of depositors’ behaviour. Hence, this research analyzes 
depositors’ response to macroeconomic, alternative investment and bank specific shocks in 
Azerbaijan.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature with a 
specific focus on market discipline in emerging countries. Section 3 introduces our sample data 
with its source of information and methodology. In Section 4 we provide empirical results with 
robustness check and policy recommendations. Finally, concluding remarks are discussed in the 
last section. 
Literature Review 
Past experiences show that large-scale deposit withdrawals can quickly cause bank run during 
critical times. An investigation of depositors’ behaviour helps policymakers to predict “deposit 
run” (better known in literature as “banking panics”6) and offer policy recommendations that can 
prevent deepening of withdrawal and its negative impact on economy as a whole. Hence, a wide 
range of researchers investigated depositors’ withdrawal behaviour. 
Up to date, vast academic literature on depositors’ behaviour can be divided into two groups. 
The first group includes works exploring depositors’ response to certain bank specific 
characteristics which is known as market discipline literature. The existing literature on market 
discipline primarily studies whether market discipline exists in a particular country within given 
period. Most of the papers focus on the US commercial banking sector and provide evidence of 
existence of market discipline. Among them Park and Peristiani (1998) find evidence of market 
discipline in the US thrift industry throughout the 1980s, as depositors were shown to demand a 
higher interest rate. Whereas the literature on market discipline is quite vast, there is limited 
number of papers testing the market disciple in the developing and emerging countries. The 
existence of market discipline in Latin American countries (Argentina, Chile and Mexico) has 
been proved by Martinez Peria and Scmukler (2001). Moreover, Peresetsky (2008) suggests that 
there is market discipline in the Russian banking system, where depositors demand higher 
interest rates from risky banks. This discipline is even stronger than in developed countries. 
They also find that market discipline weakened after the establishment of deposit insurance.  
                                                          
6According to Calamari’s and Gorton's (1991) definition of banking panics, it occurs when bank debt holders at all 
or many banks in the banking system suddenly demand that banks convert their debt claims into cash 
It is also worth mentioning that, introduction of deposit insurance fund undermines the 
significance of market discipline. The evidence on efficiency of the implementation of deposit 
insurance systems in emerging countries is ambiguous. Ioannidou and Penas (2010) highlight 
that introduction of deposit insurance in Bolivia has diminished the market discipline exercised 
by large depositors. Prior to the introduction of this system, banks with higher shares of large 
deposits took on less risk, whereas after the introduction, the effect had vanished. In line with 
their conclusion, Mondschean and Opiela (1999) and Peresetsky (2008) emphasize that 
existence of deposit insurance system has weakened depositor discipline in Poland and Russia, 
respectively. Interestingly, based on the data of 203 banks of Central and Eastern Europe, 
Kouassi et al. (2011) conclude that even in the presence of an explicit deposit insurance system 
market discipline can be ensured by interbank deposits. Explicit deposit insurance system 
encourages monitoring efforts of creditors excluded from insurance and limits banks’ risk 
seeking behaviour. 
Another distinct group of studies suggests that macroeconomic indicators should be significant 
factor to influence the depositors’ behaviour in the presence of deposit insurance system. 
Among them Levy, Yeyati, and Schmukler (2010) emphasized that bank specific characteristics 
are not the only factor affecting on depositors’ behaviour. They analyzed daily data before and 
after crisis periods and recognized that in some cases macroeconomic factors overshadowed the 
importance of bank-specific factors in Argentina and Uruguay 7 . Interestingly, the role of 
macroeconomic data becomes stronger during crisis period. Using evidence from bank run 
episodes in two emerging economies, authors conclude that macroeconomic factors are 
significant drivers of depositor behaviour in critical periods of time. In line with their 
conclusion, Martinez et al. (2001) and Arena (2003) and Dela Torre et al. (2003) also find 
evidence that traditional indicators of bank fundamentals tend to become less significant and 
explain smaller part of changes of deposit portfolio and interest rates compared to tranquil times. 
Moreover, Picorelli (2014) also finds similar evidence for Greece regarding the importance of 
macroeconomic risk in depositor discipline. Although in the beginning of the crisis banking 
system did not face liquidity or solvency problems, depositors had started withdrawing their 
deposits from banks since the end of 2009 in Greece. This phenomenon shows that the 
macroeconomic shocks affect deposit volume despite the relative “good” indicators of the banks.  
Inspired by the previous literature this paper concentrates on two issues largely unexplored by 
the existing literature. In the first place, we empirically analyze the determinants of depositors’ 
                                                          
7They used bank-level data: for Argentina 50 banks (85% of total banks assets) and for Uruguay 26 banks (97% of 
total banks assets). 
behaviour in Azerbaijan and provide new evidence regarding the importance of macroeconomic 
shocks on bank deposits.  
Further, we contribute to the literature by applying a methodology, which has not been applied 
before in market discipline literature. We use heterogeneous structural panel SVAR while 
analysing significance of macroeconomic, alternative investment and bank specific variables in 
the banking sector of Azerbaijan. Since the data from many banks is used for short time span or 
is too noisy to conduct reliable investigation using structural VARs at the individual bank level, 
we employ a panel methodology that allows individual bank responses to structural shocks to be 
heterogeneous. Furthermore, it is important to take into consideration the fact that individual 
banks are likely to be linked cross-sectionally via common national and regional shocks. To 
address these issues in the context of structural identification, we use panel SVAR methodology 
developed by Pedroni (2013).  
Data 
We assembled a dataset of 21 commercial banks of Azerbaijan which represent more than 80% 
of the banking sector (40% of GDP). Analysis covers 78 monthly observations starting from 
2009 January to June 2015. Furthermore, we interpolate non-available data and cleaned possible 
outliers. We also implemented a test for stationarity in heterogeneous panel data. The definitions 
and sources of data, as well as descriptive statistics are given in the tables 1 and 2 in the 
appendix of the document. To understand the determinants of depositors’ behaviour, the paper 
examines proxies for macroeconomic, bank soundness and alternative investment shocks. 
Classic indicators of direct macroeconomic shocks relevant to depositor behaviour are sovereign 
and currency risks8. In the first case, sovereign risk may affect market discipline as it reduces 
government’s capacity of debt repayment. Government debt to GDP in Azerbaijan is low 
(13.75%, 2014) and almost stable for the period that we used in our regression. Therefore, we do 
not consider the impact of debt shock on depositors’ behaviour in this paper. 
In the second case, depositors may react to currency shocks because existence of depositor’ 
guarantee scheme does not hedge depositors from losses coming from exchange rate 
fluctuations. However, regression analysis based on times series of foreign exchange rates is not 
applicable for countries with fixed exchange rate regime because exchange rate is stable over 
time (Figure 1). When a country is unable or unwilling devalue its currency, it must have 
sufficient foreign exchange reserves and should be willing to spend them to sustain a fixed 
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exchange rate. FX reserve of Central Bank of Azerbaijan Republic (CBAR) declined 
significantly after oil price slumped. CBAR authorities defended local currency by drawing on 
their substantial foreign exchange reserves (Figure 2). Hence, we include FX reserves of the 
Central Bank of Azerbaijan Republic to investigate relationship between currency risk and 
deposit portfolio of banks.  
Furthermore, we assume that housing market represents an alternative investment opportunity in 
Azerbaijan, since capital market is underdeveloped. Thus, we use house price per kv/m in USD 
dollar in secondary market in Baku in order to examine relationship between deposits and 
alternative investment opportunities. If deposits run from banks, the withdrawn funds might 
flow to real estate market. The relationship between deposits and house prices can evolve in two 
directions: 
 Real estate market and household deposits may have a negative relationship. In 
particular, when house prices go up, consumers may form an expectation of further growth in 
real estate market, thus prefer buying a property rather than saving their funds in bank accounts. 
On the other hand, when house prices fall, people prefer to keep money in deposit accounts 
rather than invest in real estate, as expectations of profit margins in real estate decrease.  
 Real estate prices and deposits may also have a positive relationship, because higher 
house prices will require the households to save more in order to afford buying a house.  
Beside the macroeconomic and alternative investment indicators, we include bank level data to 
examine market discipline in Azerbaijan. Interest rates paid on deposits, capital adequacy ratio 
and lag of household time deposits in national currency are used as bank specific variables.  
Interest rates are considered to reflect riskiness of banks as depositors require higher 
compensation from a riskier bank. In our analysis we use bank level data of annualized interest 
rates on households’ time deposit accounts opened during each month.  
In addition, the capital adequacy ratio is included as an indicator of banks’ soundness, which is 
measured by ratio of total capital to risk weighted assets. We expect that high level of 
capitalization helps banks to reduce risk and attract more deposits. A bank with higher capital 
adequacy ratio can absorb greater level of unexpected losses before becoming insolvent. Thus, 
high capitalization will have a positive effect on bank deposits.  
In order to check robustness of our model we use additional bank specific variable– liquidity. In 
general, banks with a large volume of liquid assets are considered to be safer, because, these 
assets will allow banks to meet unexpected withdrawals by customers. In this sense, we expect 
that banks with more liquid assets suffer fewer deposit withdrawals because these banks face 
lower risk apriori. The liquidity ratio is calculated by dividing liquid assets 9  to total asset 
according to balance sheet of each bank respectively.  
However, if Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) weakens the role of market discipline in Azerbaijan, 
interest rates, liquidity ratio and capital adequacy ratio will not affect customers’ deposits. 
Furthermore, we use households’ time deposits as a proxy for depositors’ behaviour. We focus 
on individuals’ time deposits only in national currency, since foreign currency deposits include 
increased balance which comes from national currency’s devaluation.  
Methodology 
It is important to take into consideration the fact that individual banks are likely to be linked 
cross-sectionally via common and national shocks. Therefore, the presence of heterogeneity in 
dynamics makes conventional dynamic panel methods not appropriate, as they require the 
dynamics of individual bank responses to be identical among all banks (Pesaran & Smith, 1995). 
We expect to overcome this problem, by applying Cholesky reduced form panel Vector 
Autoregressive Model (VAR) following Pedroni (2008) and Pedroni (2013). Before estimating 
VAR model, first we need to test for cross-sectional dependence in our data. 
Cross-sectional dependence relies on various factors, such as the magnitude of the correlations 
across cross sections and cross-sectional dependence itself. If cross-sectional dependence is 
caused by the presence of common factors, which are unobserved but uncorrelated with the 
independent variables, the standard fixed-effects and random-effects estimators are consistent. 
On the other hand these methods are not efficient, because the estimated standard errors are 
biased (Hoechle, 2007). If the unobserved components which create interdependencies across 
cross sections are correlated with the included independent variables, these methods will not 
work. To solve this problem Pesaran (2006) proposed new approach. 
While considering the standard panel-data model 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽′𝑥𝑖𝑡 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡  ,                   𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇 
xit  is a K×1 vector of regressors, β is a K×1 vector of parameters to be estimated and 𝛼𝑖 
represents time-invariant individual parameters. Under the null hypothesis, 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is guessed to be 
independent and identically distributed over periods. Under the alternative approach, 𝑢𝑖𝑡 may be 
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correlated across cross sections; however the assumption of no serial correlation remains 
(Cheng, et al., 2007). Thus the hypothesis is: 
H0: ρij = ρji = cor (uit, ujt) = 0 for i≠ j 
The number of possible pairings (uit, ujt) rises with N. 
Here ρij is the product-moment correlation coefficient  
pij = ρji =
∑ 𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑗𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
(∑ 𝑢𝑖𝑡
2𝑇
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1
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1
2
 
Pesaran (2004) has suggested two approaches to test cross sectional dependence using the pair 
wise correlation coefficients of the residuals in the regression equations (De Hoyos & Sarafidis, 
2006). One is the LM test of Breusch and Pagan (1980) 
LM = √
1
𝑁 (𝑁 − 1)
∑ ∑ ( 𝑇?̂?𝑖𝑗
2 − 1)
𝑁
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Here ?̂?𝑖𝑡it is the estimate of 𝑢𝑖𝑡. LM is distributed as χ
2 with N(N − 1)/2 degrees of freedom (the 
null hypothesis of interest). LM statistic is valid for fixed N as T → ∞ and when N is large and 
T is finite this test exhibit significant distortion. In this case, Pesaran has proposed the following 
alternative, CD test 
CD = √
2𝑇
𝑁 (𝑁 − 1)
∑ ∑ (?̂?𝑖𝑗)
𝑁
𝑗=𝑖+1
𝑁−1
𝑖=1
 
Unlike the LM statistic, under a wide range of panel-data models the CD statistic has mean at 
exactly zero for fixed values of T and N (including homogeneous/heterogeneous dynamic 
models and non-stationary models). 
In the next step we apply VAR model to estimate regression. The VAR model is then given by 
the following system of equations: 10 
∆zit = Γi0 + ∑ Γi∆zit−j + πit
n
j=1
 
                                                          
10 To choose lag length for reduced form VAR we used Akaike’s Information Criteria (AIC).  
∆zit = (dep, res,  housepr, ir, car)′ 
Where,  ∆zit−jis a matrix of endogenous variables; log of households time deposit in national 
currency (dep), log of FX reserves of central bank of Azerbaijan (res), log of average house 
price per each kv.m in secondary market (housepr), interest rate of individuals’ time deposits 
during the period (ir), and capital adequacy ratio (car); Γi0 is a matrix of constants; πit  is a 
matrix of innovations to: international reserve of central bank of Azerbaijan (πit
res), house price 
(πit
housepr
),interest rate (πit
ir) and capital adequacy(πit
𝑐𝑎𝑝
), with E(πit) = 0, and covariance matrix 
E(πitπis
′ ) = Ωπ. Thus, a vector auto regression is a system in which each variable is expressed 
as a function of its own lags, as well as lags of each of the other variables.  
To get orthogonalzed impulse response and variance decomposition we applied Cholesky 
decomposition (triangularization) Ωπ = LL′, where L is known as the Cholesky decomposition 
matrix for Ωπ, and then accumulated the impulse responses to see the effects of the shocks on 
the levels of the variables11. This method measures the time profile of the effect of perturbations 
on the expected future values of variables in a dynamical system. The advantages of using this 
approach is that, with panel data we can control for factors that could cause omitted variable bias 
if they are omitted, also we can control unobserved or unmeasured unobserved heterogeneity. 
Empirical Results 
As some of the information is considered confidential we refer to total rather than individual 
bank results. The structural VAR methodology outlined above is used to generate impulse 
response functions that capture the dynamic effects of macroeconomic, bank specific and 
alternative investment shocks on deposit portfolio in each bank of our sample. In this section we 
present results of our estimations to answer two questions: 1) What factors determine depositors’ 
behaviour in Azerbaijan? 2) Does macroeconomic environment overshadow importance of 
market discipline and investment opportunities alternative to depositing money in banks?.  
What factors determine depositors’ behaviour in Azerbaijan? Impulse response: 
As a result of our analysis we confirm a positive impact of macroeconomic and alternative 
investment shock on deposit portfolio over a ten months’ period. Our finding also shows a wide 
variation in the impulse responses of the (log) deposit portfolio to bank specific shocks; both 
interest rate and capital adequacy shock doesn’t seem statistically important for depositors’ 
behaviour , thus undermining the role of market discipline in Azerbaijan banking sector.  
                                                          
11See Pedroni (2008) and Pedroni (2013) for details on the identification and computation of the impulse response 
form and the decomposition of shocks into regional versus national in panels. 
While analyzing macroeconomic shock for Azerbaijan, firstly, we confirm depositors’ positive 
response to reserve shocks.  Figure 3.1 reports the median as well as the 25th and 75th percent 
quintile response to reserve shocks among 21 banks in our sample. 
Specifically, the point estimates for reserve shock reveal that for the median, one unit reserve 
shock increases deposits by about 2% in the following month, and slowly increases to 6.5% after 
10 months. As the median as well as the 25th and 75th percent quintile response to reserve 
shocks is positive, the result suggests that, the shock hit all banks in the same direction. 
Secondly, while analyzing alternative investment shock for Azerbaijan, our main finding is that 
depositors respond positively to alternative investment shock which is similar to reserve shock. 
Figure 3.2 reports the median as well as the 25th and 75thpercent quintile response of depositors 
to house price factor which confirm a positive effect after second lag. The median of the banks’ 
response reveal that one unit house price shock increases individual deposits by about 1% after 
10 month, while the initial effect is close to zero in the first month.  
Thirdly, besides the macroeconomic and the alternative investment shocks, bank specific factors 
such as deposit interest rates and capital adequacy shocks are analyzed. Figure 3.3 shows that, 
consistent with the hypothesis, there is a positive link between interest rate shock and the 
median of the total response of depositors. Fig.3.3 reports that, in spite of a positive link 
between interest rate shock and the median of the total response of depositors, there is a wide 
variation in the 25th and the 75th percent quintile responses among 21 banks. The 75thpercent 
quintile response shows that one unit interest rate shock increases deposits by about 6%, while 
the 25th percent quintile response is very close to zero. This result suggests that, there is likely a 
subset of banks for which interest rate shock matters.  
While analysing depositors’ respond to capital adequacy shock, we observe that the response is 
very close to zero (Fig.3.5).  The 25th percent quintile response, while negative, is very close to 
zero and conversely the 75th percent quintile response is positive (while remaining small). This 
implies that, both interest rate and capital adequacy shock does not seem statistically important 
for depositors’ behaviour and reject existence of market discipline in Azerbaijan. This can be 
explained by the existence of the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) in Azerbaijan. We suggest that, 
credible deposit insurance system reduces the incentives of depositors to monitor banks and 
undermines the role of market discipline.  
Does macroeconomic environment overshadow importance of market discipline and 
investment opportunities alternative to depositing money in banks?  
Our results so far indicate that explanatory power of macroeconomic shock is higher compared 
to alternative investment opportunities and bank soundness indicators. We rely to the fact that, 
the median as well as the 25th and 75th percent quintile response of bank deposits to 
macroeconomic shock is positive and more consistent across banks compared to alternative 
investment opportunities and bank specific shocks. Banks seem to be more responsive to 
macroeconomic shock, as the impulse response function is positive in all months across all 
quintiles.  
In the context of Azerbaijan our paper also highlights the effect of bank specific shock varies, 
we observe a positive response to deposit interest rates and almost zero response to capital 
adequacy shock. Thus, we conclude that market discipline is weak in Azerbaijan and market 
participants adjust their behaviour according to their macroeconomic expectations. Initial 
response of depositors to the increase in reserve is positive 2% and it cumulatively increases to 
6.5% after ten month, implying that, depositors adjust their expectation depending on changes in 
macroeconomic environment. Depositors would react to currency shocks because existence of 
depositor’ guarantee scheme does not hedge depositors from losses coming from exchange rate 
fluctuations. 
Immediate response of depositors to the increase in house prices is negative, implying that 
depositors withdraw their funds from deposits and invest in real estate on expectations of higher 
yields. However, cumulative reaction of depositors to the increase in house prices after one 
month is positive, as households would need more savings in order to afford a house. 
To summarise our central result: Depositors seem to be more responsive to a macroeconomic 
shock compared to alternative investment and bank specific shocks.  
Robustness check:  To address possibility of biased results and to check robustness of different 
variables, we consider alternative specifications by including liquidity ratio and gold price to the 
regression.  
Firstly, we re-estimated the cross section regression after including alternative soundness 
indicator, liquidity ratio. However, there is still no significant relationship between liquidity and 
depositors’ behaviour. Therefore, our results are still robust by rejecting existence of market 
discipline in Azerbaijan.  
Secondly, we re-estimated the regression using gold price as another proxy for alternative 
investment opportunity. However, the results suggest that, depositors do not respond the change 
in gold price consistently and confirm the role of the real estate investment market for the 
country. Hence, the paper contributes to existing literature by shedding light on the potential role 
of real estate market for Azerbaijan economy. 
Conclusion 
Using heterogeneous panel SVAR approach, this paper shows that macroeconomic factor-
reserve shock is the most important driver of depositors’ behaviour compared to alternative 
investment and bank specific shocks in the period of 2009- 2015 in Azerbaijan banking sector. 
Firstly, we have found evidence of depositors’ positive respond to macroeconomic shock. The 
result suggests that, market participants respond to reserve shock consistently, because existence 
of depositor’ guarantee scheme does not hedge depositors from losses coming from exchange 
rate fluctuations and they adjust their decisions based on changes in macroeconomic 
environment. 
Our findings suggest that house price is a reliable proxy for alternative investment shock in 
Azerbaijan. Although, in the first month there is evidence of substantial variation in the strength 
of alternative investment shock across banks, the effect seems to show more consistent result 
which is positive for the quintiles after the one month,.  
Conversely, while analyzing bank specific indicators (interest rate and liquidity ratio) we find 
that, depositors’ response to banks specific factors is low. We conclude that market discipline in 
Azerbaijan is weakened by existence of Deposit Insurance Fund. To summarize, our results 
indicate that, an explanatory power of macroeconomic risk is higher compared to alternative 
investment and bank specific indicators and stronger than usually considered by the literature. 
The main findings of this research also lead to important lessons for the policy debate. As 
macroeconomic shocks affect market participants significantly, government authorities may 
think about reducing the potential negative effects of currency shock to the banking sector by 
stimulating the attraction of national currency deposits. Differentiated required reserve rate, 
remuneration rate and deposit insurance premium could be applied to prevent the withdrawal of 
national currency deposits.  
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APPENDİX 
Table 1. Data description 
Variable Definition Source 
Time deposits  Individuals, national currency, stock, in logarithm Central Bank of Azerbaijan 
Liquidity  Ratio of liquid assets to total assets Central Bank of Azerbaijan 
Deposit interest rate  Individuals, national currency, during the period Central Bank of Azerbaijan 
Capital adequacy  Ratio of total capital to risk weighted assets Central Bank of Azerbaijan 
FX Reserves  
Official FX reserves of the Central Bank of 
Azerbaijan in logarithm 
Central Bank of Azerbaijan 
House price 
Monthly average house price in secondary market in 
Baku per kv/m in USD dollar in logarithm 
MBA Consulting 
Gold price Unit per troy ounce (USD dollar)in logarithm World Gold Council website 
 
Figure 1.USD/AZN currency                                  Figure2.Official FX reserves of Central bank of 
Azerbaijan and oil price 
  
Table 2. Descriptive statisticsfor 21 banks 
  
Time 
deposits 
Deposit 
interest rate 
House 
price 
Liquidity 
ratio 
Reserves Currency CAR 
 Mean 73182.0 9.9 1559.6 14.0 9497.7 0.808 15.3 
 Median 43014.8 10.3 1440.5 12.0 9976.8 0.787 15.1 
 Maximum 696498.5 18.9 2111.0 58.7 15193.4 1.050 35.7 
 Minimum 11.0 0.8 1273.0 0.3 4787.0 0.784 -31.9 
 Std. Dev. 92877.3 2.7 273.0 8.7 3613.2 0.064 5.6 
Skewness 3.2 -0.4 0.9 1.6 0.2 3.5 -1.8 
 Kurtosis 16.5 3.8 2.5 6.9 1.5 13.2 18.8 
Jarque-Bera 15278.2 99.0 251.0 1756.3 162.2 10405.0 17870.2 
 Probability 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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Observations 1638 1638 1638 1638 1638 1638 1638 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Residuals cross-section dependence test                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figures 3. Impulse responses  
Fig: 3.1 Response of time deposits to FX reserves Fig: 3.2 Response of time deposits to house price reserves 
 
 
Fig3.3 Response of time deposits to interest rates           Fig 3.4Response of time deposits to deposit 
  
Fig 3.5 Response of time deposits to capital adequacy 
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Residuals Cross-Section Dependence Test 
Test Statistics 
Breusch-Pegan LM 7690.7*** 
Pesaran scaled LM 365.0*** 
Bias-corrected scaled LM 364.9*** 
Pesaran CD 18.1*** 
